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TAXPAYER'S ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS TO PREVENT
ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF STATE FUNDS
A recent case in New York raises again the question of the right of a taxpayer to maintain against state officials an action to restrain an alleged unconstitutional use of state funds.' Acting under the authority of a statute, a
state board allocated state funds to a college operated by a religious corporation, for the enlargement of its facilities in order to meet problems of increased enrollment of veterans as students. Plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer,
brought an action against members of the board, the college and the contractor employed by it. He asked for judgment declaring the projected use of
state funds unconstitutional as involving a grant of public funds to a denominational educational institution and for an injunction restraining the board from
paying out any funds for work done on the project. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that plaintiff had not shown sufficient interest to entitle him to maintain his action.
Seemingly well established principles have long closed the door to such actions in New York. Other states have seen the problem differently. Plaintiff
urged a review of the New York position and the adoption of reasoning advanced elsewhere in support of his action.
The Basis of the New York Position
Long before the enactment of a special statute2 allowing "taxpayers' actions"
against municipalities, the New York courts had held that an individual taxpayer had no right to bring suit to enjoin alleged illegal expenditures of either
state or municipal funds.? The New York courts, after the enactment of the
statute referred to, repeatedly held that it could not be construed as giving
the taxpayer a right of action against the state or state officials.4 So far as
such actions are concerned, the view announced long ago has been often restated, that the plaintiff must show something more than a mere status as a
taxpayer or citizen "to challenge the public officers to meet him in the courts
of justice to defend their official acts."5 He must show more than zeal for
the purity of the constitution. No person or group of persons can assume to
be the guardians of the community. Incumbent on the plaintiff is the duty of
showing that he has an interest in the action distinguishable from one which
he -has in common with the general body of the state's citizens.
1. Bull v. Stitchman, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (Appeal nor: pending,
Appellate Division, Fourth Department); Buli v. Stitchman, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 202 (Sup.
CL 1947).

2. N. Y. Grax. MuNac. LAW § 51.
3. Reynolds v. Mayor of Albany, 8 Barb. 597, 599 (N. Y. 1850); Butler v. Kent, 19
Johns. 223, 225 (N. Y. 1821).

4. Goldstein v. State Commission of Correction, 182 Misc. 695, 45 N. Y. S. .1d 476
(Sup. Ct. 1943); New York League for Separation of Church & State v. Graves, 170
Misc. 196, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520,
106 N. E. 675 (1914).
5. Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N. Y. 155, 163 (1858).
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This attitude was fortified by considerations of policy. "It would be unreasonable to multiply suits by giving every man a separate right of action
for what damnifies him in common only with the rest of his fellow-citizens."0
Also emphasized is the refusal to consider constitutional questions "in abstracto."7 Simply because plaintiff is a taxpayer and citizen gives him no
right to bring before the court for review the acts of another branch of government,8 unless the wrong affects the civil, property or personal rights of the
plaintiff.
Contrary to appearances, there is no departure from this rule or the reasons
for it in Kuhn v. Curran.9 There indeed the petitioner was but a "citizen and
taxpayer" and aside from his status as such, showed no special interest of his
own involved. He sought an order directing the Secretary of State to disregard as unconstitutional a statute creating a new judicial district. The lower
court found the statute constitutional and denied relief to the petitioner. 10
On appeal, it does not appear that any party raised the question as to petitioner's right to maintain the proceeding. The Court of Appeals held the statute
to be unconstitutional and stated: ". . . in view of the importance to the public
of an authoritative determination of the question at the time, we do not pause
to consider whether the question is presented in appropriate proceedings.""
This case would seem to leave untouched the New York rule regarding taxpayers' actions against the state, if its application is invoked, even though
the question presented by the taxpayer in his action is one of "importance to
the public" and requiring "authoritative determination." Nor is there any indication that the statutory permission of taxpayer's actions against municipalities can or will be extended by analogy to permit such actions against
the state.
Other jurisdictions, like New York, refuse to entertain taxpayer's actions
against the state or state officials, but the reasons for the refusal vary. A
Washington case1 2- holds that if action is to be brought to restrain state officials
from illegal use of state funds, the proper plaintiff is not the individual citizentaxpayer, but the state's Attorney General, in his sound discretion. In this
6. Id. at 160.
7. Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520, 106 N. E. 675 (1914).
8. Id. at 529, 106 N. E. at 677. "We are of the opinion that there is no inherent power
in a court of equity to set aside a statute as unconstitutional except in a controversy between litigants where it is sought to enforce rights or to enjoin, redress, or punish wrongs
affecting the individual life, liberty or property of one or more of the litigants. The court
has no inherent power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil, property or personal rights
of the plaintiff in the action or the petitioner in the proceeding are affected.
"The rights to be affected must be personal as distinguished from the rights in common
with the great body of people. Jurisdiction as never been directly conferred upon the
courts to supervise the acts of other departments of government."
9. 294 N. Y. 207, 61 N. E. 2d 513 (1945).
10. 183 Misc. 942, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 30 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
11. 294 N. Y. 207, 213, 61 N. E. 2d 513, 515 (1945).
12. State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 151 Pac. 108 (1915).
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jurisdiction, taxpayers' actions against municipalities are allowed. The reason
given is that there is a sound analogy between such actions and "stockholders'3
actions" to protect corporate funds from illegal use by corporate officials
But the courts have refused to extend the analogy to suits against the state.
The municipality is held to be a quasi-corporation possessing only such powers
as the legislature confers upon it. The state, on the other hand, is fully sovereign, retaining all "powers not delegated to the Federal Government; and
this sovereignty appears to be the basis for the courts refusing taxpayers'
actions against the state, in the absence of statute allowing them.' 4 In another
jurisdiction, however, the court pays little heed to these distinctions and declares that the taxpayer's action against the municipality is an exception to
the general rule excluding actions by taxpayers and is better based on practical
considerations than on principle. At any rate, the exception is not to be extended to suits against the state.1
Considerations similar to those advanced in New York appear in the leading
United States Supreme Court pronouncements on the problem. In the leading
cases of Massachusetts v. Melloni'0 and Frothingham v.Mellon,'- considered
and disposed of together, attempts were made to enjoin the Secretary of the
Treasury from expending funds made available by Congressional appropriation on the ground that the purposes of the appropriation were within the reserved rights of the states. The Court found that neither plaintiff showed sufficient interest to maintain the action. In the first case, Massachusetts, suing
as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens, failed to show that any rights of
the state were brought within the actual or threatened operation of the
statute. In the second case the Court found serious practical objections to
the maintenance of the taxpayer's action. If one taxpayer were allowed to
litigate such a cause then every other taxpayer in the United States might
do likewise. "The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences," said the Court, "goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have
reached, that a suit of this character cannot be maintained."' 8 The Court also
referred to the long established principle that it has no power per se to review
and annul acts of Congress as unconstitutional. The question of constitutionality may be considered "only when the justification for some direct injury
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon
such an act. . . .The party who invokes the power must be able to show
not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally."' 9 Similar grounds are expressed in the more recent case of Ex parte
13. 4 DmLON,
m~'scrnA CoR, oRaaroNs § 1580 (5th ed. 1911).
14. Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891).
15. Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. M. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926).
16. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).

17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 487.
19.

Id. at 488.
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Albert Levitt.2 0 Thus, considerations of policy and of the wisdom of refraining from passing upon constitutional questions where speculative interests alone
are shown by the parties, rather than the concept of the sovereign's immunity
from suit seem to be at the bottom of the reasoning by which the so-called
"taxpayer's action" is denied.
Judicial Reasoning Allowing the Taxpayer's Action
Against the State
It must be admitted, however, that in the majority of the states which have
dealt with the problem, a citizen or taxpayer may maintain an action to
restrain state officials from expending public funds in violation of the constitution. Again, the reasons by which this result is reached are not uniform.
Thus,, one court has been unable to find any real distinction between a taxpayer's suit against a municipality and a like action against the state. 2 1 The
municipality has no inherent power to raisd funds by taxation. Its power to
do so is derived from the state, and in exercising such derived authority, the
municipality is but exercising a part of the sovereign power of the state. From
this it is argued that the sovereignty of the state is no less involved, except
in degree, in the determination of a taxpayer's action to enjoin illegal expenditure of municipal funds than in one to enjoin such expenditures by the state.
In another jurisdiction, it has been held that a taxpayer has an equitable
ownership in public funds, whether municipal or state, and this, combined
with the taxpayer's liability to replenish the treasury, gives him the necessary interest to enjoin
either state of municipal officials from illegally expend22
ing public funds.
Texas courts have taken the interesting position that a taxpayer may bring
suit to restrain state officials from performing unconstitutional acts on the
ground that they are not acting for or in the interest of the state and hence
an action against state officials under such circumstances is not an action
against the state.2 3 The courts will not look behind the record in deciding
who is a party to the action. Thus, the state can be made a party only by
shaping the bill against it expressly with such a purpose in view. This po20. 302 U. S. 633.(1937), where an individual sought an order requiring Mr. Justice
Black to show cause why he should be permitted to serve as an Associate Justice of tile
Supreme Court of the United States. The individual claimed that Justice Black's appointment was null and void under the United States Constitution. The petitioner had no
interest other than being a citizen of the United States and a taxpayer. The court stated
(at 634): "That is insufficient. It is an established principle that to entitle a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely
a general interest common to all members of the public."
21. Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130 (1915).
22. Elkins v. Milliken, 80 Colo. 135, 249 Pac. 655 (1926); Leckenby v. Post Co.,
65 Colo. 443, 176 Pac. 490 (1918).
23. Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S. W. 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
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sition is taken even though the official's act might have been prompted by
the law of the state, and though the state may be the real party in interest.
In a later Texas case, 24 however, it was admitted that the plaintiff cannot
maintain action against a state official acting under order of authority without
showing damages special to himself, as distinguished from those suffered by
the public at large. This case did not involve the illegal expenditure of public
funds and a still later decision 25 made this the point of distinction in allowing
a taxpayer's action against state officials to restrain illegal expenditure of
state funds. The court pointed out that the taxpayer has in such a case more
immediate interest sufficient to entitle him to sue. He has an equitable interest in the public funds to which he, to a greater or less degree, has directly
contributed. Thus, according to the Texas court, when illegal expenditures
are threatened by state officials, the interest of the taxpayer is sufficient to
allow an action by him against state officials. Such action will not be construed
to be against the state. The Texas court in Anderson v.Houts23 held that it
would be a deplorable situation if a citizen-taxpayer did not have the right
to invoke the equitable power of the court to restrain state or municipal officials
from using for illegal purposes the taxpayer's money given to them to promote the general welfare. "Such officers are the servants of the taxpayers,
not their masters, and are not above restraint in the exerc'se of the proper
powers of a court of equity. This right does not depend upon the amount involved, or on the situation or locality of the taxhayer. This right inures to
the benefit of the whole people at the suit of any taxpaying citizen."2In other states the courts have not realized nor admitted any possible distinction between taxpayer's actions against municipal officers to restrain illegal expenditure of funds, and similar actions against state officials. In the
Pennsylvania case of Page v. King 2 8 a taxpayer sued to compel a state board
to give a certain contract to the lowest bidder, as required by law, and thus
to save an illegal additional expenditure of public funds. The court allowed
the action, holding that the plaintiff had an interest in public funds and thus
could maintain a bill to prevent unlawful expenditure of state money. The
court relied on an earlier Pennsylvania case -9 where the taxpayer sought to
have declared void the awarding of a contract by a municipality. The court,
therefore, made no distinction between the taxpayer's action against municipal officials and that against state officials.
24. Lawson v. Baker, 220 S. IV. 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
25. Sherman v. Gage, 279 S. W. 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). This was an action against
the State Highway Commission to restrain it from paying out to contractors amounts
claimed for work done by them in excess of the contract prices. The court allowed the
action by plaintiffs saying that all those who had contributed to the public fund, both
ordinary taxpayers and, more directly, motor owners who had paid their license taxes,
could maintain the action.
26. 240 S.W. 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
27. Id. at 649.
28. 285 Pa. 153, 131 Atl. 707 (1926); Garr v. Fuls, 286 Pa. 137, 133 A. 150 (1926).
29. Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. 47, 31 Atl. 375 (1895).
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A Nebraska court used the same approach in holding that the taxpayer
plaintiff need not show any injury to himself in order to maintain an action
against a state official to enjoin him from issuing 'warrants for payment of
goods received. 30 The court based its holding on a case in which an action by
a taxpayer against a county official had been allowed. 31 The court pointed out
that if a taxpayer can bring no such action, no one else can, for the participant in the illegal transaction would be estopped to do so.32
An Arkansas court has held 33 that an individual taxpayer has the right to
maintain a "taxpayer's action" against state officials by virtue of a constitutional provision giving any citizen of any town, county or city the right of
action to protect himself and other inhabitants thereof against the enforcement
of any illegal exactions. The court held this provision broad enough to afford
a remedy against state wide exactions alleged to be illegal. Even without this
specific constitutional provision, the court held that the taxpayer would still
have his right of action based on the equitable ownership of public funds
34
theory.
Conclusion
Sharp disagreement thus exists among the courts considering the question
as to whether a taxpayer, without showing more, has sufficient interest to
maintain suit to enjoin state officials from illegal expenditure of state funds.
The older view, adopted in.New York, requires such a plaintiff to show some
threatened injury personal to himself as the basis of such action. The foundations for this view are considerations of policy-the danger of multiplicity of
unmeritorious actions by parties whose motives may range from publicity seeking to crusading zeal. To this may be added the reluctance of courts to pass
upon constitutional questions as academic abstractions-a situation -which
might conceivably become quite common if no restrictions were placed, as at
present, on the taxpayer's action.
The reasoning by which courts in other jurisdictions have been able to find
a basis for the so-called "taxpayer's action" against state officials is not impressive. Limping analogies between the citizen-taxpayer zealous for the con30. Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N. W. 422 (1925).
31. Woodruff v. Welton, 70 Neb. 665, 97 N. W. 1037 (1904).
32. Fischer v. Marsh, 113 Neb. 153, 202 N. W. 422 (1925). In Gaston v. State Highway Dep't, 134 S. C. 402, 132 S. E. 680, 682 (1926), where the court said that "special
or peculiar injury differing in kind, as well as in degree, from that which the public
generally will sustain . . ." has no application here, and a taxpayer has sufficient capacity
to bring an action'to enjoin the state Highway Department from constructing a proposed
hard surface road, as being reckless, useless, and extravagant. The South Carolina court
relied upon the authority of Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 33 S. C. 1, 11 S. E.
434 (1890), which was an action against a municipal board. In White Eagle Oil Co. v.
Gunderson, 48 S. D. 608, 205 N. W. 614 (1925), an action was brought by taxpayers
against state officials and allowed by the court on authority of Weatherer v. Herron,
25 S. D. 208, 126 N. W. 244 (1910), which concerned illegal acts of county officers.
33. Farrell v. Oliver, 146 Ark. 599, 226 S. W. 529 (1921).
34. Griffin v. Rhoton, 85 Ark. 89, 107 S. W. 380 (1907).
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stitution and the stockholder threatened with loss by the illegal action of a
corporate board of directors are not helpful. The same might be said of the
attempt to reason from the allowance of the taxpayer's action against municipalities to the allowance of such an action against the state. The reasoning here
misses the fundamental difference between the municipality and the statea difference which, it would seem, is beyond the power of judicial legislation
to remove. It might be said that the soundest view on which the taxpayer's
action against state officials illegally using state funds might be based is that
of sheer expediency. If no such action is allowed, it is indeed difficult to see
how the unconstitutional expenditure of state funds by state officials can be
effectively prevented. The beneficiary would not be likely, even if he were able,
to challenge the constitutionality of the grant he is to enjoy. The state
which has made the grant will not challenge it. There is left the taxpayer.
The New York view, however, is now so well established by the cases that if
a change is to come and a taxpayer is to be given the right to enjoin state
officials from unconstitutional expenditure of state funds, without his showing
more than mere status as a taxpayer, such a change must come from the legislature. It will be for the legislature to determine whether the harm which
might come from the lifting of the present judicial restrictions on the "taxpayer's action" would outweigh the benefits conferred 5
35. The Appellate Division, Third Department, one justice dissnting, has recently
affirmed Bull v. Stitchman (see note 1 supra). N. Y. Times, March 25, 194S, p. 29, col. S.

